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Abstract 
In 2013 game designer Eric Zimmerman wrote a provocative manifesto 
entitled ‘Manifesto for a Ludic Century’ (2013a), in which Zimmerman 
declares the 21st Century’s dominant cultural form to be games. 
Consequently, Zimmerman proposes that the individual occupant of the 
century is therefore in a continuous state of game engagement. As such, 
this re-contextualisation of game space and play, indefinitely articulates 
the individual as a constant player and character, and thusly challenges 
the notions of selfhood. Importantly it should be noted, the state of a 
ludic century is explicitly assumed as a truth, however superficial it may 
appear. Accordingly, this paper is then afforded to be an extended 
hypothesis of the proposed ludic century, rather than a critical dissection 
and response to Zimmerman’s manifesto. This enables a hermeneutic 
framing of the questions: ‘What does it mean to live in a ludic century?’ 
and ‘in what capacity may the self exist in the ludic century?’ These 
questions will attempt to distinguish play as an inherent cultural logic 
that extends beyond the limitations of explicit ‘gamification’ or 
instrumental play (Stenros et al. 2009; Zichermann 2010). Concluding, 
it is claimed that the ludic century elicits a sustained delusion of self, as 
the player is confined to the designed game structure, which inhibits 
authentic engagement and interaction with environment and self. It is 
proposed that this evokes a form of suffering, the compassionate play 
within the ludic century. 
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Introduction 
In 2013 game designer Eric Zimmerman wrote a provocative manifesto 
titled ‘Manifesto for a Ludic Century’ (2013a), in which he declares the 
21st Century’s dominant cultural form to be games. Zimmerman 
purports that the systemic nature of games is seeping into the societal 
and cultural orders, and as such will inform the individual occupants’ 
direct experience and comprehension of environment. This is a proposed 
phenomenological shift, which is to say a shift in direct experiences. In 
the supposed ludic "world of systems" (ibid.) the individual engages with 
culture and media on a "systemic, modular, customizable, and 
participatory" level (ibid.). As such, the individual is in a continuous 
state of game engagement and play. This re-contextualisation of game 
space and play indefinitely articulates the individual occupant as a 
continuous player and character, and as such challenges the notions of 
selfhood, as being the individual’s notion of self. This controversial 
manifesto will be the impetus for the following paper. 
However, it should be noted that this paper is not concerned with a 
critical dissection or reactionary response to Zimmerman’s manifesto, 
there are already more than enough academic publications and online 
debates that address this (Chaplin, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Stein, 2013). 
Conversely, this paper explicitly assumes a prophetic perspective of the 
manifesto. Therefore, as an extended hypothesis, this paper explores 
the possible parameters of an individual existing in the ludic century 
within the defined factions of Zimmerman’s manifesto. That is to say, 
the premise of this entire paper relies on the suspension of a counter 
argument towards the manifesto, and readily assumes the hypothetical 
situation of a ludic century. Whilst this may seem in some way 
perversely disobedient within the context of balanced academia, it is 
noted that this paper is written as a contribution towards the discourse 
of the ludic century, as a supplementary and alternative perspective, 
and not as a holistic argument or (re)-presentation of Zimmerman’s 
manifesto. 
Firstly, this paper intends to explore, in an expressive manner, the 
possibilities of existing in a ludic century. This is approached 
hermeneutically by addressing Zimmerman’s manifesto and defining the 
proposed coordinates of the ludic century. This is effectively outlining 
the conditions of the ludic environment, and how it differs from the 
traditional environment as well as how it transposes the generalised 
perspective of gameplay. Due to the proposition of a perpetual state of 
game engagement, play will be acknowledged as transcending its 
normative polemic distinctions (Huizinga, 1944; Salen and Zimmerman, 
2004). Seemingly, play in the ludic century is presented within a serious 
mind-set and ordinary context (Stenros et al., 2009), and as such this 
distinguishes play as an inherent cultural logic that extends beyond the 
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limitations of explicit “gamification” or instrumental play (Stenros et al., 
2009; Zichermann, 2010). Therefore, this developed reframing of play, 
as proposed by Zimmerman, may elicit a conflict within the paradigms 
of selfhood. That is to say, selfhood, as being the entirety of one’s own 
essential being, that may individuate them from others, allow self-
awareness and encourage responsible and autonomous behaviour, may 
in fact be challenged within the contributed notions of persistent play in 
the ludic century. This investigation is framed within the question; in 
what capacity may the self exist in the ludic century?   
This question will be presented as a symmetrical argumentation to the 
contemporary notions of free will and responsible agency (Daly and 
Žižek, 2004; Habermas, 2007). This is a somewhat recurring topic of 
interest in neuroscience and philosophy (Anderson, 2007; Libet, 1985) 
and seems to present a coalescing overlap with the proposed ludic 
century. Conclusively, it is stated that the ludic century elicits a 
sustained delusion of self, as the player is confined to the designed 
game structure, which inhibits authentic engagement and interaction. It 
is this that is claimed to evoke compassionate play within the ludic 
century. The word compassion is comprised of the prefix "com-" 
meaning "with" and the suffix "passio(n)" meaning "suffering", as such, 
it is claimed that play in the ludic century is with suffering. 
The Ludic Century 
In game designer Eric Zimmerman’s 2013 ‘Manifesto for a Ludic 
Century’ he purports the current age to be an age orientated around 
information at play, which features games as the dominant cultural 
form. As surmised by Zimmerman, this is a shift from the last century’s 
dominant cultural form as being moving image. This cultural shift, for 
Zimmerman, presents itself through a structure of a systemic society, 
claiming that 
the ways that we work and communicate, research and learn, 
socialise and romance, conduct our finances and communicate 
with our governments, are all intimately intertwined with 
complex systems of information […] [f]or such a systemic 
society, games make a natural fit (Zimmerman, 2013a). 
Zimmerman proceeds to declare that an analytical interfacing within this 
systemic society does not provide sufficient engagement, but rather that 
an appropriate form of engagement must be enacted on a playful level. 
This is something that, for Zimmerman, inexorably leads to a non-
passive model of inhabitancy, and as such "[w]e must learn to be 
designers, to recognize how and why systems are constructed, and to 
try to make them better" (ibid.). Therefore, Zimmerman is proposing a 
particular societal state which inculcates a cultural value in the player-
designer; "[a]s more people play more deeply in the Ludic Century, the 
lines will become increasingly blurred between game players and game 
designers" (ibid.). Needless to say, the manifesto provoked a high 
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degree of controversy and attracted its fair share of criticism (Chaplin, 
2013). These criticisms ranged from the entire absence of the basic 
need of a manifesto's call to action (Johnson, 2013), to claims of 
Zimmerman's manifesto being concerned primarily with a niche idealised 
mono-culture and addressing the ludic century through an inherent 
techno-centric relevance (Stein, 2013). 
What should be noted, however, is that Zimmerman readily avows that 
the manifesto was "incredibly self-serving", stating on his website: "In 
the future, games will be the central force in culture, and everyone will 
be a game designer. Is it really hard to believe that this was written by… 
a game designer? (Original emphasis)" (Zimmerman, 2013b). 
Zimmerman also wrote, as a response to a Tweet: "I was hoping for 
opposition to the wildly unsubstantiated and self-serving claims of the 
manifesto" (Zimmerman, 2013c). This effectively designates the 
manifesto to be written all in good humour and as an ironic sentiment to 
engage polemic within the gaming community. Nonetheless, 
Zimmerman adheres to his claims, positing "perhaps the ludic century 
won’t end up being about 'games' as we know them at all" (ibid.). He 
makes an explicit separation from the reception of the ludic century as 
engendering any form of a "gamified" culture. ‘Gamification’ is 
something that he defines as a process in which the superficial aspects 
of games; levels, maps, points, characters and so on, are applied in a 
manner purely to engage an ‘audience’, this is the "instrumentalisation 
of games" (Zimmerman, 2013d). 
It is unclear in the manifesto how, or specifically by whom, this shift will 
become initiated, yet Zimmerman’s ambiguity in this instance instils 
optimism that this shift is not bound to a specific generation as being 
the most susceptible to the shift. Unlike the rather stilted claims 
proposed by author and game enthusiast Gabe Zichermann, a strong 
advocate of gamification, who presents a rather deflating and insipidly 
titled, "Generation G". A generation of gamers who have been “re-
wired” by gaming dynamics, altering their culture, mechanics, skill sets 
and so on. For Zichermann, this generation have radically mutated 
abilities and contorted perspectives of the world (Zichermann, 2011). 
Needless to say, this is somewhat of a vapid lifeless claim, and it is an 
exercise that perpetually alienates and creates spectacles of 
generations, mythologizing and “massifying” groups of individuals. 
The key fundamental difference between Zichermann and Zimmerman’s 
approach to a play orientated society is the implicit distinctions between 
mind-set and context (Stenros et al. 2009, p. 271). “[W]e can make 
government fun, we can make getting fit fun, we can make searching 
fun… we can make anything fun or work depending on its design” 
(Zichermann, 2010). Zichermann is clearly proposing a serious mind-set 
in a playful context. A hypothetical example may be observed whilst 
paying taxes; a serious mind set is assumed for what is considered 
‘work’ – that is to say a ‘not play’ activity. Yet, if the tax form has 
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somehow been “gamified”, in which there is a form of immediate 
challenge and reward designed into the task, the “ordinary context” has 
now transgressed to a “playful context”. Which, for Stenros, evokes a 
form of “instrumental play”, in which “the context of play is utilized for 
an external purpose” (Stenros et al. 2009, p. 271) i.e. efficiency in tax 
payments. 
This is fundamentally on the contrary to Zimmerman’s radical 
proposition. It appears that Zimmerman is proposing, within the ludic 
century, “ordinary life” as produced through a “serious mind-set” within 
an “ordinary context”, will become entirely informed by play on a basal 
level. That is to say, play is a phenomenon that will inform life in its 
utter entirety. Play will be intertwined with ordinary life in such a way 
that it will become impossible, and incomprehensible, to uncouple it 
from ones direct experiences. In the ludic century play becomes a 
prevalent penetrating influence beyond mere “instrumentalisation”, as 
Zimmerman states "perhaps the ludic century won’t end up being about 
'games' as we know them at all" (2013c). 
Certainly, this clear difference challenges the core notions within the 
designation of play and non-play, which is to say that, for Zimmerman, 
even the space of non-play will still be occupied and informed, on some 
level, by play. This rather convoluted binarism of play and non-play is a 
continuously contested subject, notably throughout the multiple 
iterations, definitions and applications of the “magic circle” (Huizinga, 
1980). It would seem to be a rite of passage, in a critical discourse of 
games, to diligently pick the concept and metaphor to pieces, to 
iconoclastically dethrone its rather grandiose status (Zimmerman, 
2014). 
Concordantly, there have been several instances of re-sculpting and 
grafting of new terminologies within the protocol of the magic circle 
(Castrova, 2005; Lammes, 2006, Juul, 2008). In some instances there 
are declarations for it to be discharged from studies all together 
(Crawford, 2009; Calleja, 2012; Zimmerman, 2014). Nonetheless, the 
semantic squabbles are enough to crystallise that there is a true 
pertinent value in the conceptual division between play and non-play. As 
the ubiquitous space of play is one of the key factions of Zimmerman’s 
manifesto, there is applicable value in expounding the argumentation 
and explicating the contextual relevance of the space(s) of play. 
A Magic Space of Play 
The attempts at defining the spaces of play are of great importance, 
even if they do retain a futility within their self-referential locale of 
definition from within specific studies, as a working definition. The 
somewhat verbose definitions of spaces of play are in fact a hermeneutic 
process of articulation; an interpretation that implicitly regards what is 
meant when one claims to be in or out of play. The following instances 
outline a fraction of the surrounding discourse in concern with this 
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juncture of interpretation. The focus will be held around the apparent 
orthodox approach within the contentious subject of the “magic circle”. 
The magic circle is a conceptual metaphor as coined by Johan Huizinga 
in ‘Homo Ludens’ (1958), and expounded in ‘Rules of Play’ (Salen and 
Zimmerman, 2004). It is a pseudo-dogmatic approach that is 
unremittingly flogged by academics. The apparent concrete structure 
denotes a separation and demarcation of the structures and spaces of 
play and non-play as being outside of reality and as reality itself. As 
such, this concept is engaged on a much deeper ontological level than it 
seems to acknowledge. Nevertheless, it is not clear whom, if anyone at 
all, judiciously upholds these principles of the magic circle. In 
Zimmerman's cathartic essay ‘Jerked Around by the Magic Circle’ 
(2014), he dispels the mist of confusion that surrounds this concept, and 
declares it to be a hyper-structuralist fiction exercised by no one, yet 
the effigy of the phantom jerk continues to be burned: "The magic circle 
jerk doesn't exist. Nobody really takes the hard line that everyone wants 
to criticise. I'm sick of the magic cycle jerk. Let's bury the bastard 
(original emphasis)" (ibid.). 
Gordon Calleja concordantly adheres to Zimmerman’s perspective; "It is 
high time that we abandon the concept of the magic circle altogether, 
(along with modifications thereof)" (2012). In adherence, this paper will 
not linger on the cataclysmic subject matter, as the proverbial dead 
horse that it is. Neither will there be an attempt to create a new 
catchment buzzword, or repackaged ‘essence’ so as to comply with the 
new factions of the ludic century. However, other variations on the 
magic circle will be noted so as to reveal the strata of discourse 
surrounding the subject. This will help to frame the radical propositions 
of spaces of play within the ludic century, and its divergence from 
traditional modes of engagement. 
There have been multiple attempts to re-classify and remodel the 
notions of the magic circle, as if it were a respected ancient relic. One of 
these attempts was by economist and game specialist Edward 
Castranova. He attempts to transpose the metaphorical circle to a 
"porous" semi permeable membrane, which may be "considered a shield 
of sorts, protecting the fantasy world from the outside world" 
(Castranova, 2005, p. 147). Cosmetically, this has the appearance of 
manipulating the concept of the magic circle by re-establishing the 
function of the metaphor, swapping the "circle" for a “membrane” that 
may be passed between. Yet, Castranova preserves Huizinga's magic 
binarism of play and non-play by phrasing his boundaries as "earthly" 
and "synthetic" worlds. This ultimately sounds very similar to Salen and 
Zimmerman’s definition of the original magic circle: "To play a game 
means entering into a magic circle, or perhaps creating one as a game 
begins (emphasis added)" (Salen and Zimmerman, 2004, p. 3). These 
are the non-inherent emergent rules of play as created by the players. 
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There have been similar attempts to reconfigure and re-place the magic 
circle within other metaphorical forms, such as a puzzle piece (Juul, 
2008) or a node (Lammes, 2006), but they each seem to maintain an 
ascription of play to a specificity of confining borders. Yet, these borders 
are inherently defined and transgressed by the players in each instance 
of play. As noted by game scholar T.L. Taylor, "[a]s players blend game 
and nongame space, they simultaneously complicate preconceptions 
about authentic or legitimate play" (p.113, 2007). These few examples 
of the convoluted argumentation that orbits the subject of the magic 
circle, and more generally the spaces of play and non-play, serve to 
illustrate the complexities within the systemic nature of a ludic century 
that Zimmerman proposes. 
Explicitly demarcating concrete borders or suggesting permeable 
membranes is ill suited to such a systemic society, as it inherently 
warrants a generic binarism and implies normative behaviours. Meaning, 
there is no leniency for deviation in play-spaces, or acknowledgement of 
‘abnormal’ behaviours in play. It is a rigid system that does not foster 
independent development and creation, which are integral factions 
within Zimmerman’s manifesto. Rather, there may be more value in 
establishing the possibilities for a multiplicity of assembled play and 
non-play spaces, beyond a juxtaposed antagonism. That is to say, each 
instance of play may define its own form of play-space, which is not 
indebted to the persistent paradigm of binarisms. As such, there must 
be an allowance for an irregular oscillation of border, one that may flex 
with each shift and modulation that is initiated by the players. 
Therefore, the working definition of play-space becomes an empirical 
phenomenological definition. Which is to say, with each unique 
occurrence of play there may be no regularity or rigidity of border, or 
generic utilisation of play-spaces beyond the direct experience. 
To clarify, each instance of play intrinsically solicits an isolated specific 
form of border definition, which may oscillate irregularly. That is to say, 
the border may shift and deform itself with each moment of play 
enacted by the players. Therefore, there may be no ascribed border, or 
ultimate definition of “border”; its only consistency is in its transitory 
characteristics. As such, this is why the definition and actuality of 
“border” and play-space remains within an empirical spectrum, it must 
be experienced to be verified and to be actuated. Yet, it may not remain 
‘actual’ as a generic applicable definition beyond that specific moment of 
play experience. Sophomorically, this is somewhat similar to the 
infamous line “you had to be there”, trying to setup the situation for a 
joke and then attempting to describe and re-enact that joke never quite 
delivers the expected response, even though all the words were said in 
the right order and all the right expressions were made. The joke had to 
be experienced for what it was in that moment, and may not later be 
ascribed to dislocated conditions, ergo “you had to be there”, just like 
the rules of play and defined borders of play-space. 
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Additionally, this working definition also gels with Zimmerman’s proposal 
within his manifesto that “[i]n the Ludic Century, everyone will be a 
game designer” (2013a). He claims that when the players envelope 
themselves deep within a game, they engage on a level similar to that 
of a designer. Therefore, the player experiences a perspective equal to 
that of a rule maker, constructer and architect whilst in play. 
To Live in the Ludic Century 
It may be surmised at this juncture, that to live in the ludic century 
means to be both player and designer in a perpetual state of 
transgressing and contorting borders. These borders may be the 
definition of the player-designer role, the attribution of play-space(s) as 
well as the explicit rules of play. It would also appear that the self, that 
is to say the unique distinguishable individual, is elicited to behave in 
any way they themselves deem fit. This is because the self issues the 
defined borders and modes of engaged play and non-play, as previously 
stated. Certainly, this goes beyond the somewhat perfunctory binary 
attribution of defining what is “good” and “bad”, but may transgress to 
modes in which the self may maintain responsibility for actions. For 
instance, in an extreme example, if the “rules” of Social Darwinism are 
initiated there may be an enabled affordance towards a sociological 
disavowal. The “rules” of Social Darwinism permit the conception of 
biological superiority, and causally also inoculates sociological attitude 
and cultural logic. As such, one may witness a human suffering who also 
seems to match the descriptions of an apparent weaker race, and as 
such, within the “rules of play”, they are suffering justly and therefore it 
is beyond ones responsibility to help. Therefore, the player-designer 
articulates and enacts the coordinates of their own responsible 
behaviour. 
At cursory glance, this sentiment of the ludic century fostering the 
possibilities for players defining their own rules and spaces of play has 
the appearance of being an effective proclamation of independence and 
freedom. It declares that the player within the ludic century is not 
subjected or marginalised by rules and constructed boundaries beyond 
their own construction, but is apparently an autonomous agent, whom 
may engage in the definition of their own game. However, paradoxically 
this will be explicated as a practice of self-deception and negation. 
Additionally, this engenders a symmetrical argumentation to the 
contemporary notions of free will and responsible agency. 
Therefore, within the capacity of being a player-designer, it is elicited 
that perhaps a new form of bad faith (mauvaise foi) may become 
instated. Bad faith is effectively a deviance and falsehood initiated by 
the self to deceive the self. Which is to say, “the one to whom the lie is 
told and the one who lies are one and the same person” (Sartre, 1984, 
p. 89). These lies inform ones actions and direct phenomenological 
engagement within their environment, ultimately producing a person 
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whom is victimised by their own life choices. This form of lying may be 
experienced in a variety of instances and in varying degrees of severity. 
For example, claiming to not be able to leave work until 6 p.m. is in fact 
a lie, there is a choice to stay at work because one wishes to keep ones 
job and get paid money for their time. There are no chains or locked 
doors keeping this person captive, and as such there is an inherent 
choice in their actions that is being negated. Therefore, in the ludic 
century, it is possible that the individual designs the terms and rules in 
which they engage with their environment, and then enacts these in the 
role of the played character. 
Using Chess as an example, each piece has a defined restriction of 
movement, a Pawn may only move one square on each turn, but a 
Knight may ‘jump over’ pieces and moves in an ‘L’ shape. These are 
restrictions ingrained to the defined pieces within the state of play. Yet, 
of course, if these Chess pieces were given to a child, one would swiftly 
realise that all the pieces can also leave the board, be thrown across the 
room, chewed and hidden under the furniture. Yet, in the ludic century, 
these intrinsic rules of play are practiced continuously in an “ordinary 
context” and “serious mind-set”, this is the bad faith of acting-as-if-
unable when in fact able. Importantly, this actuated mode of action is 
entirely engendered by the “deceived”, as they occupy the role of 
player-designer, the deceived and the deceiver is one and the same. 
Consequently, within the ludic century the fabricated characteristics of 
the played character do not exist, in the sense that the characteristics, 
or essence, do not precede the acting individual self. They are 
transcendent, as an exterior not belonging to the individual. An action 
may be “the intention of the character of which he plays […] but this 
character, precisely because he does not exist, is a transcendent 
(original emphasis)” (Sartre, 1984, p. 88). Just as with Live Action 
Roleplaying (LARP), the cloak of a wizard may be donned, but it makes 
the wearer no more magical than without the cloak. The cloak is not 
belonging to the self, but rather to the played character. Therefore, 
there is a seemingly present illusory self in the ludic century, appearing 
as an entirely fictitious set of actions in accordance to a set of arbitrary 
rules and laws. The self is in in-existence, in a state of non-being, due to 
its manifestation though nomological mechanisms and rules that are 
defined by the self, yet enacted by the played character. This is to say, 
the self, as the unique distinguishable individual, may never be actuated 
beyond the actions of defining rules. The played character is the 
dominant form, i.e. one is present more often as a wizard than as one’s 
self. 
Once the rules are defined the metaphorical cloak is worn and the 
played character is manifest as the dominant form of engagement, not 
the self. One behaves and (inter)-acts in everyday life as character, 
rather than self. Additionally, as previously defined, the outlined 
boundaries of play, within rules, roles and spaces, are subsequently 
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contorted and redefined by the player, as character, within each unique 
occurrence of play. That is to say, the LARP wizard may now, as a 
character, rearticulate the rules of game engagement without the need 
to remove his cloak and “re-enter” into the role of self. 
Concordantly, it may be surmised that to live in the ludic century is to 
live as a dislocated self, and as an engendered character in play, which 
challenges the traditional concepts of autonomy and free will. As such, 
there is a value in briefly re-framing these dense concepts by noting the 
contemporary neuroscientific and philosophical engagements of free will 
and their inherent overlap with the framework of Zimmerman’s 
manifesto. Notably, this will be issued via Jürgen Habermas and Slavoj 
Žižek’s reactions to a recent scientific publication that claims "[w]e 
stand at the threshold of seeing our image of ourselves considerably 
shaken in the foreseeable future" (Elger et al. 2004, p. 37). 
Free Will: A Non-Substantial Self 
Ultimately, the core of the free will argument is orientated around 
variations of questions engaged with autonomy and accountability for 
actions. As such, the overarching structure is concerned predominantly 
with the capacity of how an individual may maintain a sense of self. 
Some neuroscientific discoveries, such as Benjamin Libet's landmark 
experiments, have challenged the presumptive sense of agency within 
free voluntary actions by demonstrating that a voluntary act is in fact 
preceded by, what Libet calls, a "readiness potential"(Libet, 1985, p. 
529). What this means is that there is a prior correlative brain activity 
that leads up to an endogenous voluntary act, an act that has an 
internal origin with no exterior influences. As such, this means that a 
seemingly conscious act of free will can actually be predicted, due to the 
subconscious brain activity that occurs up to half a second before the 
act. Therefore, this is immediately challenging the notions of an 
individual’s agency and acts of free will. Of course, this discovery made 
by Libet has been challenged due to its interpretative nature (Trevena 
and Miller, 2002), and there have been many disputes and attempts to 
contradict his experiments (Brass and Haggard, 2007). Nonetheless, this 
illustrates that the notions of free will and responsible agency are in a 
contestable state, and as such may warrant license for extended 
hypothetical investigation. 
Specifically, this will take shape within a critical response to pragmatist 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas' 2007 paper in concern with free will, from 
a perspective of self-perception and responsible agency (Habermas, 
2007). Habermas declares outright that there is an "indisputable" 
progression emerging in neuroscience, which is something that poses a 
"genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency” (ibid, p. 
13). Habermas cites the journal Brain and Mind (Gehirn und Geist), in 
which eleven neuroscientists declare free will to be an illusion, claiming 
that in the near future the prediction of psychological processes such as 
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sensations, emotions, decisions and so on, will be possible. 
Consequently, "[w]e stand at the threshold of seeing our image of 
ourselves considerably shaken in the foreseeable future" (Elger et al., 
2004, p. 37). For Habermas, this means that if motivations, actions and 
deliberations may be reduced to a "nomologically determined 
interaction" - an interaction bound to reasonless absurd law, "then we 
would have to view free will as a fiction" (Habermas, 2007, p. 20). 
Which is to say, if all actions and thoughts may be predicted then they 
must in some way pertain to a causal or calculable reason and this, as 
such, negates the key sentiments of free will and autonomous agency. 
Ultimately, in the adversary confrontation of a diminished notion of self, 
Habermas steers towards an idealist preservation of the 'traditional' 
notions of self; claiming that the knowledge gained from the 
neuroscientific investigations should be effectively ignored. It appears 
that Habermas wants to prohibit the advancement of knowledge to 
sustain an illusory sense of self. Almost as if not wanting to open one’s 
eyes after waking from a great dream, so as not to acknowledge the 
world outside. This is a sentiment that appears to hold a direct 
symmetry within the structure of the ludic century. In which, the “play” 
of self within the engendered character, as with the aforementioned 
cloak wearing wizard in LARP, takes precedence over the possible radical 
confrontation and enlightenment of engagement with the actual 
authentic self, the non-substantial self. Which is to say, persistent 
engagement with the character is a direct avoidance of engagement 
with the actual self. This perspective is also present in cultural critic and 
philosopher Slavoj Žižek’s writing on a conference at which Habermas 
spoke. 
Žižek states that Habermas' solution is "death", and as such the paradox 
is that “Habermas, the great Enlightener, adopts basically the Old 
Catholic strategy of 'better not to know': in order to save human dignity, 
let's not probe too much" (Daly and Žižek, 2004, p. 93). Conversely, 
Žižek is exploring the capacity and possibility of a human life endowed 
with the knowledge of the self in non-existence. This is a theory that 
Žižek is framing within the Buddhist sentiment of anatman. Anatman is 
the self's inexistence, an emptiness, a non-substantial self. Žižek claims 
that the moment in which the scientific results that abolish free will are 
readily accepted, there would be an event of enlightenment. This would 
become an "attainment of Nirvana, which liberates us” (Žižek, 2014, p. 
69). Sophomorically, this “liberation” through knowledge and acceptance 
may be compared with Christmas celebrations. Acknowledging that 
Father Christmas does not exist permits an enlightened understanding 
towards the holiday, and rather than ruining the holiday, the 
enlightened perspective details new avenues of experience. 
What is important to note, is the liberation that Žižek refers to is in no 
sense transcendence. It is not a spiritual disconnect or uncoupling from 
the immediate environment, but rather emancipation from illusion so as 
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to live directly within the environment - a kind of harmony in discord. 
That is to say, Žižek is not proposing that some form of ‘higher realm’ 
may be accessed through the attained knowledge of a non-substantial 
self. Rather, he proposes that enlightenment may be attained within the 
already present direct experiences that are currently obfuscated due to 
the false illusion of self. Yet, this is contrary to what is occurring in the 
ludic century. The players are manipulating, reinvigorating and 
synthesizing the delusional sense of self. This is engaged through the 
player association, a connection to what may be called the character in 
play or “projected identity” (Stenros et al., 2009, p. 260). Therefore, in 
the ludic century, enactments and engagements within the direct 
environment are synthesised. 
Cosmetically, this is evident within the play of a game such as Parkour. 
In which, typically urban environments are re-contextualised as 
obstacles to be efficiently traversed by the player, the traceur, by 
“running, climbing, jumping, vaulting and quadrupedal movement” 
(Puddle and Maulder, 2013, p. 122). Therefore, the space is not being 
directly encountered for what it is in its original capacity, but instead 
repurposed to cohere with the active game. As such, in this sense I 
disagree with Stenros’ deductions of “found” play space, he claims that 
“[t]he traceur uses urban landscape as a found playground (Stenros et 
al., 2009, p. 262)”. The playground is not “found” it is coerced into 
existence through the designed game. The space is engaged with as if it 
was something else, and this is elicited through the individually 
constructed boundaries, contextualisation and omnipresence of play. 
This is the true compassionate play. The word compassion is comprised 
of the prefix "com-" meaning "with" and the suffix "passio(n)" meaning 
"suffering". As such, the compassionate play in the ludic century is 
evoked within the active obfuscation and mutation of environment, an 
environment never being encountered, and the self that traverses the 
space is an illusory phantom. 
This form of play has an inherent tone of desperation, as spaces are 
“psychogeographically” explored and erected in lieu of authentic 
confrontation and engagement. This is in some way similar to a child 
that never learns that a tree branch may be more than a sword or a 
gun. Therefore, the capacity in which the self may exist within the ludic 
century appears to be evident firstly as an actuator of boundries, then 
as a player and finally as a designer within the character of gameplay. 
This model of engagement presented within the ludic century, 
intrinsically inhibits the capacity of the exploration of the non-substantial 
self, and fosters the potentialities of suffering through play, the 
compassionate play.    
Whilst speaking at the Games for Change Conference in 2013 Eric 
Zimmerman stated that: "In my mind every game implies its player, it 
builds an implicit model of what it means to be human, by virtue of the 
way the game is structured and propagates that idea into the world" 
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(2013d). This brief statement distils the majority of the elements that 
were previously stated in this paper. Yet, in the ludic century games do 
not only imply its players through its structure, games are designed in 
such a way so as to actually manifest the implied model-player through 
play and imitation. Finally, I claim that the ludic century endorses the 
delusion of self through a faux-engagement, directly by not confronting 
the non-substantial self, or even the environment in which the delusion 
is enacted. This cultivates an individual whom maintains a detachment, 
anonymity and distance to the environment they exist in (Turner, 2003, 
p. 29). In the ludic century the individual is dethatched and ordered via 
subservience to nomological reasoning. 
Conclusion 
The actuality of a ludic century in contemporary society is a heavily 
debatable subject, yet it was not the motive for this paper to engage 
such arguments. It was noted in the introductory stages of this paper 
that any dissection or critical reactionary response to Zimmerman’s 
manifesto was not of concern, as there is already more than enough 
academic publications and online debates that address this (Chaplin, 
2013; Johnson, 2013; Stein, 2013). Conversely, this paper explicitly 
assumed the position of an extended hypothesis that explored the 
possible parameters of an individual existing in the ludic century, 
structured within the defined factions of Zimmerman’s manifesto. Whilst 
it may have seemed in some way perversely disobedient within the 
context of balanced academia, it was noted that this paper is written as 
a contribution towards the discourse of the ludic century, as a 
supplementary and alternative perspective, and not as a holistic 
argument or (re)-presentation of Zimmerman’s manifesto. 
The two salient points of enquiry were firstly, the framing of what it 
means to live in a ludic century, which was investigated via the polemic 
of play-space using the magic circle as contextual groundings for game 
and play orientated debate. It was concluded that the only consistency 
in the ideal of bordered spaces of play belonged to their transitory 
characteristics. This was surmised due to the fact that each instance of 
play intrinsically solicits an isolated specific form of border definition, 
which may oscillate irregularly. A border may shift and deform itself with 
each moment of play enacted by the players. This is proposed so as to 
progress beyond the re-articulation of traditional ‘relic’ binary 
definitions, and embrace a dynamic rather than concrete definition of 
play space. As such, the apparent empowerment of the player-designer 
within the ludic century challenged the fundamental notions of selfhood. 
Concordantly, this was framed within the symmetrical argumentation of 
the contemporary notions of free will and responsible agency. 
This argumentation was framed around the theorists Jürgen Habermas 
and Slavoj Žižek. Habermas proposed a prohibition of the advancement 
of knowledge and a sustained delusion of self. Whereas Žižek 
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instantiated his perspective as akin to the Buddhist sentiment of 
anatman, as existing with the knowledge of the self’s inexistence. The 
ludic century was then reasoned to be enacting the Habermassian 
reservation and sustained delusion of self which is actuated through the 
model of player-designer, and is placed in parallel with the Sartrean 
theory of bad faith (mauvaise foi) as the deceived and the deceiver is 
one and the same. Finally it is claimed that the ludic century may in fact 
be fostering the disassociation and detachment from the direct 
environment, as well as inhibiting the possible authentic confrontation of 
the in-existence of self. It is this that is claimed to elicit suffering; the 
compassionate play within the ludic century. 
It is hoped that this brief expressive investigation into the hypothetical 
situation of a true ludic century, may be acknowledged as a critical 
participation towards the discourse of games in culture, rather than a 
parochial reaction provoked by a broad manifesto. Perhaps, further 
research may regard the possible present similarities between an 
algorithmic logic and the systemic construction of the ludic century; 
both as rule-based systems that maintain radical influence on an 
individual’s direct experience of environment. It has been made clear 
throughout this paper that the conclusive decision of declaring absolute 
truths of whether or not the ludic century is present, imminent or 
redundant hold little to no value. Yet, from a theoretical perspective 
there may be value in interpreting and defining what is means to be in 
such a condition, and this intern may encourage further debate and 
research. 
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